In North and South Yemen, disparities in patterns of private and public ownership were far more subtle than the designations "capitalist" and "socialist" suggest.
In contrast with Germany, their marriage was more a merger than a takeover.
To the outside world, the unification of the two Yemens in 1990 resembled the German experience in minia? ture. North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic, YAR) was considered a laissez-faire market economy, whereas the South (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, PDRY) was "the communist one." When, weeks ahead of Bonn and Berlin, San'a and Aden announced their union, Western commentary assumed that in Yemen, as in Germany, capitalist (northern) firms would buy out the moribund (southern) state sector and provide the basis for future economic growth.
In theory, and in Germany, capitalism and socialism are distinguished by patterns of private and public own? ership of the means of production. In North and South Yemen, however, differences in ownership patterns were largely evened out by comparable access (and lack there-of) to investment capital. Disparities in the relative weight of private and public enterprise were far more subtle than the designations "capitalist" and "socialist" indicate.
Indeed, available data on private and public participation reveals common patterns of spending. The North's state sector invested more than did the private sector, while the South's socialist policy statements belied the increasing role of domestic and foreign private firms.
Relatively poor countries situated on the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula's oil economy, both Yemens relied on labor remittances and international assistance. Both Yemens faced austerity when falling oil prices, compounded by a drop in Cold War-generated aid, reduced access to hard currency?until the discovery of oil in the border region in the mid-1980s attracted a third type of international capital from multinational petroleum companies. These forces cumulatively reduced the differences between the two systems and added an economic dimension to the polit? ical incentives for unification.1 In contrast with Germany, their marriage was more a merger than a takeover, for nei? ther was in any position to buy the other out.
Two Economies
Historic Yemen was a cultural entity rather than a polit? ical unit; its formal division stemmed from British impe? rialism in the South. Unlike the relatively isolated, inde?
pendent North, where a semifeudal agrarian society persisted, the South developed capitalist classes, markets and enterprises. The major port between the Mediterranean and India, Aden's modern infrastructure and services attracted a small indigenous capitalist group, a working class of stevedores and industrial labor, and a small urban middle class, including shopkeepers and intellectuals.
San'a, by contrast, was a center of Islamic conservatism ruled by a Zaydi Shi'a imam. Strict trade and investment restrictions protected a few monopoly importers and large landowners. Would-be bourgeoisie and working class aspi? rants escaped this restricted environment for the free port at Aden. The North was ripe for a kind of bourgeois revo?
lution, opening the door to capitalist development, just when the South's radical anti-imperialism slammed the door to foreign investors. After the 1962 revolution and 1962-68 civil war, the North (the YAR) became a "no doors" economy, with few legal barriers to either trade or investment. Revolutionaries in the South after 1968 nationalized or collectivized many foreign enterprises, large estates and fishing boats. Whereas the South (the PDRY) was subsequently governed by a sin?
gle Soviet-style Marxist party, in the absence of legal parties politics in the North were dominated by fluid trib? al, Islamic and leftist "fronts" covertly supported by other Arab regimes.
The two Yemens shared a physical environment where household-scale cereal and livestock production employed most men and women. Both governments were unsure of their authority in the countryside, and each backed ele? ments of the other's opposition. The economies remained intertwined. In the early 1970s, the Southern bourgeoisie, some of them originally Northerners attracted to Aden's port economy, moved back north to Ta'iz, Hodeida and San'a, where they established businesses and held gov? ernment posts. After the rise in oil prices in 1973, worker remittances fed consumption (imported goods, residential construction) rather than productive investment, despite both regimes' efforts to mobilize these funds for agricul? ture and industry.
The North was more affluent and enjoyed higher con?
sumption of imports, but it also had far worse current account deficits. Although the labor force was still pre? ter, mostly in the east, remained private.3 By contrast, the revolution in the North nationalized only the royal family's prime tracts. Over half of the large farms were private and were conservatively managed, fre? quently employing sharecrop labor and moving only slow? ly toward capitalist farming. Most dry land in both sysSheila Carapico, an editor of this magazine, teaches international relations at the University of Richmond in Virginia. She is currently in Yemen on a Fulbright grant, researching political developments since unification. Both regimes advocated farm mechanization, yet typ? ical Yemeni farmers planting sorghum or millet with their own draft animals on small, scattered, often terraced parcels were unable to profitably invest in pumps, tractors or trucks, even with remittance income. Each regime turned to "coop? eratives" around 1974, hoping to combine petty savings and remittances for investment in nurseries, equipment, repair stations, storage facilities and marketing services. Southern holders of redistributed land formed purchasing and marketing cooperatives. Sixty-odd cooperatives helped up to 50,000 members acquire inputs in the mid-1980s, but instead of moving toward full-scale cooperative farms, 29 state farms abandoned group farming and only two pro? duced collectively. 4 In the North, although groups known colloquially as "cooperatives" built stop-gap rural infrastructure, the 20-odd agricultural, fishing and craft cooperatives foundered on difficulties in both credit and marketing.5 Unlike in the South, participation was purely voluntary, and often made no sense as an investment. While a few cooperatives prof?
itably ran diesel stations or rented drilling rigs, most failed to mobilize and manage share capital. After nationalization, public ventures controlled 60-70 percent of the value of industry in the South, includ? ing power and water and the oil refinery (the single largest employer). Mixed companies produced cigarettes, batter? ies and aluminum utensils; wholly private firms were either small-scale plastic, clothing, glass, food and paper-goods manufacturers or traditional carpentry, metal, pottery or weaving industries.
Whereas the South inherited modern plants and offices, the North embarked on its first modern enterprises only in 1970. Despite liberal investment incentives, private manufacturing grew slowly. An industrial complex near Ta'iz producing sweets, soaps and plastics, owned by the Hayel Saeed Anam Group, dominated large-scale private industry. The remaining large private factories were most? ly food processors or bottlers. Light industry consisted mainly of repair and construction "workshops" and crafts.
Unlike in other Third World countries with a large pool of labor, the proximity to the Persian Gulf's oil economies drove wage levels up. Roughly a third of adult males were absent for at least a year or two during the oil boom decade (1974-84). The North imported not only teachers and health professionals but construction and hotel workers. While planners and international experts were initially opti? mistic about the investment potential of remittances, the class that benefited most from laissez-faire were Northernbased money changers and importers, middlemen to the migration-and-consumption cycle. The North's open import markets attracted a commercial bourgeoisie from the lower Red Sea region, resulting in a predominance of service sector investments.
Those with cash to invest?local traders, North Yemeni migrants to the Gulf, and entre? preneurs from Aden, Asmara, Djibouti or Mombassa? were lured to the North's currency, real estate and import markets, where they profited from the hefty share of remit? tances spent on consumer goods.6
Extraordinarily unfettered currency and import mar? kets worked better for the North during the boom than the bust cycle. Global recession and depressed oil rents slashed remittance and aid levels, undermining, postpon? ing or eliminating private and public projects by the thou? sands. The Yemeni riyal (YR), having been kept artificial? ly high at a uniform rate of YR 4.5 to the dollar for over a decade (stimulating imports), plummeted to YR 18 to the dollar in the winter of 1986-87. Facing balance of payments and currency reserve crises from 1982 onwards, San'a tem? porarily banned all imports, blocked rampant smuggling, reformed and enforced tax codes and, in late 1986, took over currency markets and halted new investment projects. 7 The secondhand bonanza in the North was gone, and with it the "hands-off' policy of economic nonmanagement.
Ownership and Investment
Ideologies differed from plans, and plans from outcomes. At best, the North's capitalist orientation and the South's socialism represented tendencies or goals, for both were really "mixed" economies.
The relative contribution of private and public capital can be measured in several ways. The North experienced a trend during the oil boom away from private capital formation towards public investment. In 1975, the private sector provided two-thirds and the state only one-third, but these proportions were reversed by 1982. By 1987, the North Yemen government financed three-quarters of invest? ments in agriculture, fisheries, transport and communi?
cations, and nearly all utilities and mining development? amounting to two-thirds of all investment. Individuals funded most new construction, trade and hotel business, and 70 percent of manufacturing. Private investors' pref? erence for real estate speculation over agricultural pro? duction was particularly disconcerting to planners; where? as overall growth was a healthy 6.6 percent, in agriculture it was only 2.4 percent. 8 Nor was the South ever an entirely state-owned econ?
omy. By the 1980s, the overall patterns of external financing in the two Yemens were remarkably similar. For more than a decade, the West and the conservative states of the penin? sula had shunned the South, and the Soviet Union, its allies, China, and radical Arab regimes were also the North's main benefactors. The global and regional mul? tilateral agencies did work with the South, however, led by the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA). After 1980 the easing of tensions on the Peninsula prompted Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi to offer assistance; by the middle of the decade, Arab funds surpassed assistance from socialist countries.14 In North Yemen the Arab oil monarchies were the most visible donors in the 1970s, and the IDA exercised the most influence in economic policy. North Yemen's devel? opment assistance peaked in about 1981 at over $1 bil? lion, and declined to half that amount in 1985 and to less than $100 million in 1988.
By that time, both countries relied on a similar list of donors and creditors. Grants were normally limited to small-scale technical assistance programs from the UN or European donors, or showy "gifts" from wealthy Gulf mon? archs. Most new capital formation came from "soft" loans with low interest charges and long repayment schedules. Thus debts accumulated against the accounts of interna? tional benefactors roughly in proportion to the amount of aid provided. 15 The extent of polarization between "social? ist" and "capitalist" trends was mitigated by the fact of Arab, IDA, Soviet, Chinese and European loans for both development programs. Infrastructural projects were the bedrock of government development investment. Bilateral donors chose their own design, engineering and construc? tion firms, and global and Arab multilaterals applied the World Bank bids and tender system.16
Utilities?immense industrial plants supplying urban water and power nationwide?were also financed from diverse sources. After studying the South's poorly functioning Sovietbuilt system, World Bank economists recommended an allYemen electrification grid to maximize economies of scale, and IDA initiated financing for this joint grid in the mid1980s. While not the first joint North-South venture, this involved unprecedented inter-Yemeni coordination.
Integrated rural development (IRD) was the Western and multilateral agencies' strategy to equip rural regions with roads, utilities, and some social services. The most prominent IRD projects throughout Yemen followed the World Bank model, whereby infrastructure, credit and technical assistance stimulate rural investments by indi? viduals or cooperatives. They were introduced in the areas of North Yemen best suited to intensive cash farming: the semi-tropical Tihama plain and the temperate south? ern uplands. By 1987 integrated projects, with different components from IDA, UN organizations, several Arab funds and the European Economic Community, at least theoretically covered most of rural Yemen.
These schemes followed a similar pattern in both coun? tries. The South's largest IRD project, the Wadi Hadramawt project, stressing road construction, groundwater studies, deep wells mechanization and credit through cooperatives for fertilizers and pesticides, was modeled on the Tihama Development Authority project.17 The only difference was that in the South credit was available exclusively to coop? eratives, whereas in the North, private loan applications were also accepted. Had farmers flocked to mortgage their land for bank loans (other than for qat, disallowed from loan applications), this might have been a significant dif? ference; instead, credit officers in both systems bemoaned the lack of applications, and public spending in agricul? ture far outpaced private and/or cooperative financing.
Petroleum
The latest stage in the convergence of the two Yemeni economies occurred in the nascent petroleum industry. Here the convergence was literal: deposits discovered in the North/South border region were jointly developed by the two states in cooperation with international firms.
Both state petroleum companies relied on foreign exper? tise. Soviet petroleum companies conducted on-and off? shore studies for South, and by the late 1970s conces? sions were won or under negotiation by British, French, Italian, Spanish, Kuwaiti and Brazilian firms. Thirteen international firms had explored in the North. In 1984, Yemen Hunt, then a wholly-owned local subsidiary of Texas-based Hunt Oil, made the first significant discov?
ery, beyond Marib near the joint border. Soon Exxon, and then a consortium of South Korean firms, bought into Yemen Hunt; Texaco, Elf Aquitaine, Total, Canadian Occidental, and USSR firms negotiated and paid to drill for Yemeni oil. The Soviet company Technoexport made a major find in 1986 at Shabwa, across the intra-Yemeni border from Marib. Discoveries in turn created scores of sub-contracting opportunities for suppliers and builders from around the globe, such as the US firm that built a small modular refinery near Marib and a Lebanese-ItalianGerman group that laid the pipeline. There were new com? mercial finds in 1987,1988 and 1989.1s Realization of the commercial potential of the MaribShabwa basin required both inter-Yemeni cooperation and foreign capital and expertise. Not only was security around oil fields astride their common border improved by joint production, but the North hoped to use existing facilities at Aden, including the port and the refurbished BP refinery, which in turn needed the business. vergence of two ideologically different systems on a com? mon, and eventually joint, pattern of public-foreign part? nership on the "commanding heights." A more "mixed" venture could hardly be imagined, for the whole package included not just the joint Yemeni corporation but two of the largest capitalist oil giants, Exxon and Total, and Soviet and Kuwaiti state corporations. Destined to overshadow the value of property and investment in other sectors, this technically public venture was shortly followed by the polit? ical unity accord.
Thus the flow of capital into Yemen as aid and remit? tances created systems dominated by "development pro?
jects" on the one hand and "uncaptured" farming, migra? tion and informal sector trade on the other. Recessions in international oil prices and worldwide assistance cutbacks seriously disrupted both economies, leading to draconian austerity measures in the North and contributing to the out? break of factional strife in Aden in early 1986. The discov? ery of oil gave Yemen access to a new source of foreign financ? ing, corporate investment, and the promise of hard currency revenues. Oil rents, unlike aid, would strengthen the power of Yemeni policy makers by financing the general account rather than earmarked projects.
Many of the arguments advanced for unity stressed the economic advantages, such as combining Aden port facili? ties with the North's private transport network, utilizing both the South's professional cadres and northern-based entrepreneurs, taking advantage of larger markets and economies of scale and maintaining all existing foreign trade and aid relationships. The prospect of economic improve? ment offered considerable popular appeal because of wide? spread political unease and economic dissatisfaction in both polities, personal and social ties of the northern bourgeoisie to families or places in the South, political leaders' cross?
cutting ties, and a common sense of nationalism.
Articles 7 and 8 of the constitution approved in popular referendum in May 1991 call for a mixed economy based on "Islamic social justice in production and social rela?
tions," a developed public sector "capable of owning the basic means of production," "the preservation of private ownership," and "scientific planning which leads to the establishment of public corporations engaged in exploit?
ing the national and public resources, developing capa? bilities of and opportunities for the public, private, and mixed sectors." 20 The government budget approved in February 1991 listed recurrent and capital expenditures for 91 production-oriented public firms, 40 service-oriented public companies and boards, and 17 mixed ownership cor? porations.21 More "socialist heritage" has been retained in Yemen than in Germany.
Before any economic benefits of unification could be real?
ized, the Gulf crisis disrupted the flow of remittances and aid from Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Newly unem?
ployed migrants and their families, numbering upwards of a million, streamed into the cities just as operating funds in many social services sectors drained away. 
